Crits and Cricket: The Deconstructive Spin (or Was It A Googly?) by Hutchinson, Allan C.
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University 
Osgoode Digital Commons 
Articles & Book Chapters Faculty Scholarship 
1991 
Crits and Cricket: The Deconstructive Spin (or Was It A Googly?) 
Allan C. Hutchinson 
Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, ahutchinson@osgoode.yorku.ca 
Source Publication: 
Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory. Toronto, ON: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd., 
1991. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/scholarly_works 
Recommended Citation 
Hutchinson, Allan C. "Crits and Cricket: The Deconstructive Spin (or Was It A Googly?)." Devlin, Richard F, 
ed. Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory. Toronto, ON: Emond Montgomery Publications Ltd., 1991. p. 
181-205. ISBN: 0920722296 
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Osgoode Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles & Book Chapters by an authorized administrator of 
Osgoode Digital Commons. 
-
Crits and Cricket: A Deconstructive Spin 
(Or Was It a Googly?) 
Allan C. Hutchinson 
Osgoode Hall Law School 
"Do you know who made you?" "Nobody, 
as I knows on," said the child, with a 
short laugh . . . "I 'spect J grow' d." 
Harriet Beecher Stowe, Uncle Tom's Cabin 
Something of a precocious "child," critical legal studies (CLS) is already in its teenage years. 
Jn its short, but hectic life, it has already made a significant contribution to modern legal 
thought and practice. Measured quantitatively, its presence is strong and incontestable: there 
are around 800 articles and books that can loosely be grouped under the rubric of CLS. Its 
qualitative impact is more controversial: its intellectual reception runs from enthusiastic 
acceptance to vehement rejection. Indeed, the intensity and heat generated by CLS writers, 
both collectively and individually, testify to its growing significance in jurisprudential debate 
and practice. Many have chastised CLS for its irreverence and a few have gone so far as to 
demand its ejection from the law schools.I Yet most would agree that CLS is the most 
challenging and exciting genre of legal criticism to force its way onto the jurisprudential 
scene for many a decade. 
· Now facing the awkward rites of adolescent passage - a certain crisis of identity, a 
keener appreciation of race and gender differences, and a relative loss of social innocence-
the time is ripe to take stock of CLS's development and its relevance to Canadian 
jurisprudence.2 It must be said that CLS is an American phenomenon. Its very shape and life 
history can be fully comprehended only in terms of the history and practice of the concrete 
circumstances of the American legal, academic, and political establishments. The most 
pertinent factors include the lack of any sizeable left tradition in popular politics; the isolation 
and victimization of left intellectuals in the universities; the male monopoly on legal and 
political power; the legacy of institutional racism; the thoroughly professional orientation of 
legal education; and the centrality of the Supreme Court in the constitutional scheme and 
national psyche. Nevertheless, its methodological insights, suitably muted, are pertinent to 
the Canadian context. The objective of this essay is to explain the nature and aspirations of 
CLS 's central ideas and ambitions. After a brief glimpse at the origins of CLS and its general 
orientation, I will explicate the substance and aspirations of the "law is politics" claim. In 
order to substantiate this discussion, I will offer a typically deconstructive-style CLS reading 
of a case and end by emphasizing the democratic possibilities of such an approach. 
181 
182 Critical Legal Studies 
I 
Over the past decade, CLS has mounted a major offensive on the whole edifice of modem 
jurisprudence. The fight is over the meaning and enforcement of "the entrenched clauses of 
the constitution of the republic of [legal] knowledge."3 Put crudely, the central thrust of 
CLS 's attack has been to continue and go beyond the realist project by allying it to a program 
ofleft politics. Many CLS conclusions are far from novel or surprising, but they do comprise 
the most sustained and serious attempt by left lawyers to expose the political dimensions of 
the adjudicative and legal process. Not sjmply an intellectual tendency, it exists as a 
membership organization. Many of the founding CLS members were students during the 
civil rights movement and the anti-Vietnam campaign of the 1960s. As such, CLS recognizes 
these activist roots as the energy source of much of its theoretical endeavour - there is 
nothing so practical as a good theory. Practical commitment and group solidarity remain 
crucial values in the CLS ethos. In the early 1970s, the closest place to a haven for legal 
radicals was the Law and Society Association. But there was already disenchantment with 
its "empirico-behaviourist" alignment.4 After some discussion, CLS was officially born in 
the spring of 1977 at a conference at the University of Wisconsin at Madison. Its membership 
includes law teachers, lawyers, social theorists, and law students. As well as being an 
intellectual focus and clearinghouse for left writers, it represents a collaborative network to 
support and reinforce the professional activities of like-minded people. 
There are many different strands to CLS and its members run from the disaffected liberal, 
through the radical feminist, to the utopian anarchist. Much of its organizational strength and 
intellectual integrity reside in this diversity and eclecticism. But they unify in their common 
opposition to the intellectual and political dominance of the liberal establishment. Although 
liberalism once contributed to the improvement of the social lot, it has now outlived its 
usefulness and has become a dangerous political anachronism. Offended by the hierarchical 
structures of domination that characterize modem society, CLS people work toward a just 
world that is more democratic and egalitarian. They do not wish to embroider further the 
patchwork quilt of liberal politics, but strive to cast it aside and reveal the vested interests that 
thrive under its snug cover. Their ambition is to make a bigger social bed with more popular 
bedding. Not surprisingly, CLS 's particular contribution to this social struggle has concentrated 
on the leading part that law has played in maintaining the status quo and stymieing efforts at 
fundamental change. 
A ·common question is whether CLS is realism rewarmed or realism rejected.5 It is both 
and neither. As CLS views it, in the 1920s and 1930s, realism toppled the regnant formalism 
not as a prelude to overthrowing liberalism, but as a way of making good on the liberal 
promise. Realism's attacks were never intended to be more than a palace revolution.6 The 
realists were ideologically and practically wedded to the reform program of New Deal 
liberalism. They effected a prag~atic shift of institutional focus rather than a thoroughgoing 
rejection of liberal politics: they wanted to replace judge-dominated legal science with 
bureaucracy-wielded policy science. Indeed, the fact that most lawyers today can claim, with 
considerable credibility, that "we are all realists now"7 says much about the traditional view 
of realism. In contrast, CLS has redoubled the realist assault on formalism and extended it . 
to political as well as legal claims of scientific rationality: Like the neo-formalists, such as 
Hart and Sacks, that followed them, the realists smothered the truly radical insights and 
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implications of its critique. CLS has salvaged these powerful insights and insisted that no 
objectively correct results exist, regardless of whether they are presented in terms of legal 
doctrine or policy analysis and no matter how skilled the advocate or judge is. For CLS, the 
taking of political sides is inescapable. 
Although CLS offers a thoroughgoing and ideological critique of law and liberalism, it 
has not stepped back into the welcoming arms of orthodox Marxism. CLS has no truck with 
the belief that there is a direct causal and substantive nexus between material conditions and 
the legal superstructure. It denies the possibility of discovering intelligible and settled laws 
of historical/social/economic/etc., change. While recognizing that law often does act as a 
weapon and shield for the "capitalistic" organization of society, CLS argues that law 
functions as much as a legitimating force as a deterministic instrument. Law and society are 
not separate spheres, but are mutually constitutive and they interpenetrate. In this sense, CLS 
builds on the more critical part of the Marxist canon. 8 Like liberalism, Marxism glimpsed the 
corrosive power of social relativity and historical contingency, but suffered a final lack of 
nerve in completing the modem rebellion against the view that there is any natural or 
inevitable form of social organization. CLS has refused to shrink back from the subversive 
implications of this imperative. 
For CLS, critique must begin and proceed with the operation of law as ideology. This 
is not to trivialize the coercive functioning of much law, but to supplement and strengthen 
the radical critique. For CLS, the rule of law is a mask that lends to existing social structures 
the appearance oflegitimacy and inevitability; it transfonns the contingency of social history 
into a fixed set of structural arrangements and ideological commitments. CLS • s demonstration 
that the status quo and its intellectual footings, far from being built on the hard rock of 
historical necessity, are actually sited on the shifting sands of social contingency, is both 
critical and constructive. Not only does it expose the illusory and fraudulent claims of 
traditional writers, but it also clears the ground for different and transformative ways of 
thinking about law and society. In a world in which law plays such an important role, the need 
to understand the historicity and ideology of the lawyer's way of thinking about, and acting 
in, the world is so important. From abstract theory to thick descriptions of legal doctrine, CLS 
writers have explored the intimate relation between law and the routine practices of social 
life.9 
In mounting its uncompromising offensive on law and legal theory, CLS has operated 
on two major and mutually supportive fronts. Although they function in harness, they can be 
treated separately for the purposes of explication as operating "internally" and "externally." 
The internal critique takes seriously conventional writing, both scholarly and judicial. CLS 
engages jurists and judges on their own turf and shows how they fail to live up to their vaunted 
standards of rationality and coherence: they cannot withstand the debilitating force of their 
own critical apparatus. The main target of CLS has been the crucial distinction between law 
and politics; or, to be more precise, the alleged contrast between the open ideological nature 
of political debate and the bounded objectivity oflegal reasoning. CLS rejects this axiomatic 
premise of traditional lawyering. Beneath the patina of legalistic jargon, law and judicial 
decision making are neither separate nor separable from disputes about the kind of world we 
want to live in. Legal reasoning consists of an endless and contradictory process of making, 
refining, reworking, collapsing, and rejecting doctrinal categories and distinctions. Doctrinal 
patterns can never be objectively justified and consist of a haphazard cluster of ad hoc and 
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fragile compromises. Legal doctrine is a small and unrepresentative sample of conflictual 
problems and their contingent solution. 
The esoteric and convoluted nature· of legal doctrine is an accommodating screen to 
obscure its indeterminacy and the inescapable element of judicial choice. In the cold light of 
CLS day, traditional lawyering is reduced to a clumsy and repetitive series of bootstrap 
arguments and legal discourse becomes merely a stylized version of political discourse. Yet, 
and most important, this revelation of indeterminacy is not tantamount to a dismissal oflegal 
doctrine as incoherent or unintelligible. Its purpose is to clarify rather than to cloud our 
understanding of doctrinal operations. Nor is it tantamount to a suggestion that doctrinal 
development is autonomous from the status quo-oriented prejudices of ideological debate, 
for there exists doctrinal indeterminacy with an ideological slant. The judicial emperor, 
clothed and coiffured in appropriately legitimate and voguish garb by the scholarly rag trade, 
chooses and acts to protect and preserve the propertied interest of vested white, male, and 
monied power. 
The CLS claims of indeterminacy and contradiction do not simply go to legal doctrine 
and theorizing, they go to the very heartofliberal democratic politics. Doctrinal indeterminacy 
is a localized illustration of the bankruptcy of liberal theory and practice. The ailing corpus 
of black-letter legal theory cannot be made good by injecting a dose of black-letter political 
theory. Liberalism embraces a host of dualities, such as objective/subjective, male/female, 
public/private, self/other, individual/community, or whatever, as devices for providing a 
plausible description of the world and a convenient prescription for action. As in the legal 
sphere, political debate is open-ended and unclosable. It exhausts itself in an agonized 
struggle for the very elusive Archimedean point outside history and society from which to 
mediate the dualities and sustain a position of normative equilibrium. Liberalism is pervaded 
by contradictory principles with no metatbeory to reconcile them. Political decisions and 
social arrangements can never be objectively justified and amount to contingent choices. But, 
while they are arbitrary in a theoretical sense, these decisions are not arbitrary in a practical 
sense, because they follow the general pattern of established interests. 
Although most CLS work is seen to work along the "internal" front, it draws much of 
its theoretical purpose from the simultaneous campaign being waged on the "external" front. 
While the intemal critique is powerful and productive, its success is necessarily limited. A 
demonstration of rational incoherence and internal contradiction is only fatal within a liberal 
tradition of rationalist epistemology.10 This concession far from trivializes the internal 
critique, because the established and irrepressible presence of incoherence and contradiction 
delegitimates and demystifies the authority of law in constructing and maintaining social 
reality. To be fully convincing and successful, the whole liberal tradition of rationalist 
epistemology must be discredited and dismantled. This is exactly what the "external" critique 
of CLS takes aim at. CLS does not simply contest the practical policies yielded by traditional 
legal theorizing, it rejectS the very basis of contemporary legal theorizing. As in the 
celebrated dispute between Galileo and the Italian establishment, it is not merely the truth of 
nature that is at stake, but the nature of truth itself. CLS seeks to reformulate the ground rules 
by revising the epistemological and political criteria for valid legal theory. Drawing on the 
work of radical philosophers and social theorists, CLS is attempting to provide a fresh 
touchstone for distinguishing good know ledge from bad. Although traditional scholars pride 
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themselves on being engaged in "a continuing dialogue with reality,"11 CLS rejects the 
structure of that dialogue and the substance of that reality. 
Despite its pluralist protestations, mainstream lawyering and legal thought remains in 
thrall to an ideal of legal/political rationality. CLS writers have ruthlessly attacked this 
"foundational" thinking. There is no privileged ground for legal/political argument to stand 
or build on. Doctrinal understanding is more a matter of professional familiarity and political 
partiality than moral insight and technical correctness. Legal/politjcal rationality is no Jess 
constructed than the courts of law themselves. For CLS, there is no position of theoretical 
innocence or political neutrality. Any act of interpretation or judgment has indissociable 
political and historical dimensions. The question of what amounts to valid knowledge is itself 
a socio-political matter. Legal epistemology is ideological warfare fought by other, more 
esoteric means. 
II 
Despite common understandings about the political character of law, there remains a core 
belief that law retains an essential degree of autonomy. Legal interpretation can, and should, 
be performed in a way that distinguishes it from the more open-ended, ideological debates 
that are the stuff of political struggle. Borne and practised in politics, the idea is that law 
somehow manages to retain a distinct accent and idiom that speaks to politics, but is not 
entirely spoken for by that politics. As law is not optional and can be coercively imposed, the 
independence and impartiality of lawyers and judges is paramount. "[Their] authority and 
immunity depend upon the assumption that [they] speak with the mouth of others."12 Legal 
reasoning is something more than simply what lawyers happen to say. If it was only that, it 
would warrant no greater (nor lesser) respect and deference than what ideologues, steelworkers, 
and accountants say or sing. 
To provide a convincing justification of the crucial distinction between law and lawyers, 
it must be shown that the doctrinal materials that comprise the law cannot offer determinate 
guidance in the resolution of most legal cases. In a political and legal system that claims to 
be democratic, such impersonal constraints on the important activities ofunelected officials 
is vital to that system's continued legitimacy and appeal. This need is particularly acute in 
the area of constitutional adjudication. In other words, I will argue that legal interpretation 
is thoroughly political because its performance and product can never be detached from the 
identities and interests of the interpreters. In short, the prestige and authority of lawyers is 
unfounded in political practice and unfoundable in political theory. 
Doctrinal analysis remains the primary work of the law student, professor, practitioner, 
and judge. The task of the lawyer is portrayed as similar to that of the warehouseperson. Law 
comprises a great storehouse of rules, principles, and similar normative goods that have been 
individually catalogued and systematically shelved. During the course of business, goods 
shift in and out of the warehouse in response to the quantity and quality of legal trade. Apart 
from keeping the detailed inventory, doctrinal analysts have to ensure that incoming norms 
are screened and sorted so that the e{Cisting stock is not contaminated by unsuitable or errant 
goods. At any time, however, experienced scholars can point to a principle or set of rules that 
is appropriate to revolve a particular litigate dispute. Also, they will be able to perform a 
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thorough stock-taking and present a workable account of the totality of normative goods 
housed. An exhaustive survey is precluded by the open-ended character of such goods, and 
the brisk nature of legal trade. Doctrinal analysts do not consider the elucidation of an 
underlying prescriptive theme or grander nonnative unity to be part of their job description. 
They feel that they have ample work cutout for themselves in conquering the technical details 
in their own chosen alcove of the doctrinal warehouse. Doctrinal analysts accept that 
economics or philosophy might be valuable to a broader understanding of their warehousing 
craft, they simply do not think that it is their responsibility to pursue such inquiries. 
Under this traditional division of jurisprudential labour, such a pursuit falls squarely 
within the duties oflegal theorists- that is, to provide the larger and more integrative view 
of law, to evaluate its performance, and to fathom its relation to other disciplines. This 
contemporary project has taken many diverse shapes and sizes. Some have turned to the 
humanities for inspiration and found recent writings (of Rawls, Nozick, Hayek, or ... ) in 
political and moral philosophy to be precisely what the jurisprudential doctor ordered. Others 
have preferred the social sciences and find intellectual succour in the models of the 
economists or sociologists. Still others have resorted to the study of language itself and taken 
comfort in its hermeneutic possibilities. Yet, in raiding these other disciplines, legal theorists 
have maintained an often neglected, but shared informing ambition. They have sought to 
supplement the doctrinal analysts' understanding of the Jaw by revealing the inherent 
rationality or normative underpinnings of the law.13 
This replacement of black-letter law with black-letter theory should not come as a 
surprise. Contemporary legal theory is a more sophisticated continuation of the traditional 
search for Coke's "artificial reason and judgment oflaw ."14 Straining the truly radical insights 
and implications of the realist critique through a traditional sieve, contemporary scholars 
have served up a thin gruel of neo-forrnalism. Interdisciplinary study is not necessarily more 
liberating nor less narrowing. The shift from ratio decidendi to Pareto optimality or Kantian 
normativity is of dubious merit. The role of interdisciplinary study is not to supplant legal 
reasoning nor to provide a substitute for legal wisdom, but to locate and understand them 
better. In delving into the foreign fields of other scholarly disciplines, the hope remains 
constant. There is no desire to open up the legal project to the subversive messages of some 
of those toiling in the anthropological or sociological soil of radical study. The objective of 
this extra-legal adventure is to complete the traditional program of legal theory, not to 
undermine its validity or success. 
The force of this commitment to understanding law and its study as autonomous is 
revealed in the literature on adjudication. The primary and self-imposed task oflegal theorists 
is to explain and suggest how judges can make the law responsive to changing social demands 
and, at the same time, retain democratic legitimacy. Jn other words, how can judges engage 
in politics in a distinctly "legal" way? The realization that, without an organizing and 
informing political vision, legal reasoning is reduced to a desultory game of catch-as-catch-
can and is part of the received conventional wisdom. Legal theorists recognize that the larger 
questions of political justice must be addressed by any serious account oflegal development 
and that adjudication is quintessentially political in perfo1mance and product. 
Without a workable and convincing separation of law and politics, therefore, the 
legitimacy and prestige of courts and legal doctrine is undermined. However, in defending 
this crucial distinction, it is important to understand what claims are and are not being made; 
Crits and Cricket 187 
the nature of the distinction and its modem articulation are of a very particular kind.15 All 
lawyers concede that legal activity, whether it pertains to legislation, litigation or law 
enforcement, arises in broadly political circumstances and that it will have some political 
consequences. Notwithstanding this, the law-and politics-problematic assume that there can 
exist a way of thinking about law and politics as independent and separable entities that is both 
possible and desirable. It must not only satisfy the constraints of immanent or transcendent 
rationality, but must meet the demands of political justice. While I do not think that such an 
achievement is attainable, it suffices to say that that immaculate position has not been attained 
to date. Theidea that the many different judges in many different places might all be operating 
unknowingly under the influence of one-"invisible hand" or "mind ," stretches the bounds of 
credulity to breaking point. The idea that this unifying mentality is not only just, but happens 
to be the same as the theorists making this discovery, is surely too much even for the most 
faithful among the academic establishment. Consequently, although our existence in the law 
school and the legal community at large may demand a focus on matters legal, it does not 
follow that law and lawyering must be treated as a distinct way of thinking and acting. 
Because legal theorists deal with what lawyers do, it does not mean that they have to elevate 
it to a privileged category of human activity with a special epistemological and ontological 
status. Although federal parliamentarians are not provincial representatives, it does not 
follow from this fact that their basic identity as politicians is different in any normative or 
critical sense. 
At a general level, law and politics interact and interpenetrate in manifold and mutually 
generative ways. Law is not only a political artifact of the first-order, it is also a primary 
artisan of its political context. Legal interpretation is a thoroughly political phenomenon and 
activity. The life of the law is more than logic and less than our total experience. Of course, 
it does not mean that, because law and politics are fully implicated in one another, they 
replicate each other in a simple or undistorted fashion. There is no form of social life "out 
there" independent of the law that constitutes and structures it. Nor is there any law "out 
there" independent of the society that generates and defines itself though that law .16 
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to describe a state of affairs without drawing 
on the lexical imagery of legal relations. As a white man, father, husband, worker, property 
owner, etc., my life is saturated with and organized around different legal ideas. While law 
works to impoverish the richness of my life by reducing it only to legal relations, it does play 
a significant role in formulating my own self-image and patterns of behaviour. The act of 
representing the wor:ld to which law applies is already thoroughly informed and constituted 
by the forms ~nd structure oflegal thinking. Law does not function as an independent variable 
in a complex social equation, but amounts to some of the very fibers and sinews of social life. 
It is not possible to think or act as a lawyer without taking a political stand or having a vision, 
no matter how unconscious or crude, of the collective and individual possibilities for human 
development. 
The whole practical operation of the law is illustrative of how lawyers (and laypeople) 
treat the law's conceptual apparatus and discursive categories as natural and how, in the 
process, they confer the status of the real and concrete on the abstract and metaphorical. For 
instance, when deciding whether a contract exists between two parties, lawyers speak and act 
as if they were looking for a "contractual" thing in a drawer full of social events and 
circumstances. It is assumed that, if all the facts were known, " the contract" would somehow 
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body forth and bring the dispute to a demonstrable close. Yet, as all Jaw students know, a 
contract is an idea, not a thing; it is an abstract construction in a socio-historical context. It 
exists in the realm of metaphysics, not in the world of physicality; a written contract is not 
the contract, but simply evidence of the contract. 
Similarly, property does not comprise the tangible objects in the physical world, but the 
abstract relation between such visible effects and people.17 Although born of historical 
expediency and sustained by political convenience, legal categories, like contract and 
property, take on a life of their own and begin to paralyze the lawyers' imagination. Unlike 
the life of the so-called natural world, social activity responds to these conceptual metaphors 
and reproduces itself in accordance with them. The life of Jaw and lawyers is not unaffected 
by prevailing ideas about what life should or ought to be. Not only does this give the law a 
patina of plausibility and coherence, it allows lawyers to refer to "reality" as confirmation of 
the naturalness and inevitability of prevailiing legal structures and their underlying values. 
The fact that this process occurs unconsciously makes it no less political and much more 
effective. Defmitions of law and its component parts are not referential facts, but political 
claims and ideological appropriations.18 
III 
Under the rubric "law is politics," the critics take a very different view of the epistemological 
status and methodological validity of law's claim to determinacy. Legal doctrine does not 
conform to any simple internal rationality nor is it reducible to a cluster of external organizing 
principles. While there is clearly an inseparable and organic relation between law and 
politics, there is no one account of that relation that is valid for all time and all societies. 
Indeed, any explanation is itself indeterminate because its character and implications vary 
with the context.19 While they offer opinion and evaluation, they do not make claims about 
whether doctrinal materials necessarily and universally determine results nor whether those 
results are necessarily and universally good or bad. Crits are decidedly against any kind of 
functionalist or instrumentalist account of tthe relation between law and politics, whether it 
comes from the right, left, or centre of the political spectrum. Law is " neither a ruling-class 
game plan nor a repository of noble if perverted principles ... [but] a plastic medium of 
discourse that subtly conditions how we experience social life."20 
With imagination and industry, legal materials can be organized to support and justify 
incompatible outcomes. The fact that the general drift of these outcomes corresponds to the 
orientation of status quo thinking and values is not necessary; it is not a matter of doctrinal 
rationality, but a question of political orientation. The socio-economic context is itselflargely 
indeterminate and requires no particular rule for its continued survival, while a shift in the 
whole regime of legal rules (for example, the postal acceptance rule and the finders' rules) 
will not be crucial. Moreover, in the same way that the socio-economic contextunderdeterrnines 
law, that very same law overdetermines the possible outcomes to any legal dispute. There is 
a general and pervasive indeterminacy that plagues all attempts, not simply jurisprudential 
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Even where there appears to be a consensus on the existence of any particular rule, 
nothing necessarily flows from that concession. Whether a rule exists, and what it means, are 
different enquiries. While they are not entirely unrelated, the issues give rise to a different set 
of conceptual and normative concerns. For example, a person's ability to identify the French 
language is of little help in determining what any particular example of it means. Rules do 
not operate as impersonal and dispositive forces in social conflicts. Their existence and 
meaning are more often the consequences, rather than the causes, of a particular resolution. 
Furthermore, even if there is a consensus on the meaning and existence of a particular rule, 
there is always another rule that competes for application; or, the dispute can be reclassified 
to another doctrinal field, for instance, from tort to property or contract.21 Indeterminacy 
infiltrates all levels and dimensions of the law; it energizes and debilitates the interpretive 
process and search for meaning. 
The effort to identify one definitive and normative explanation of that regime is defeated 
by the fact that a theory will not be able to achieve the appropriate mix of analytical generality 
and historical particularity. It will run the risk of overinclusion or underinclusion. A theory 
that merely describes the extant details oflegal practice will not be able to predict the direction 
and nature of doctrinal change. It will cease to be useful at the very time its assistance is most 
required - the identification and resolution of hard cases. On the other hand, a theory that 
attempts to move beyond such detailed description will run into two major obstacles. It will 
be unable to account for a sufficient range of present legal data and lose its descriptive power. 
Alternatively, it will be compatible with various combinations of legal materials that 
comprise existing legal doctrine and fail to deliver on its predictive promise. 
Contrary to the traditional view, the law is a locus of conflict. There are a host of different 
interpretations competing for descriptive and predictive superiority, but none is able to claim 
final victory. Insofar as uncontested interpretation is only possible where there is a 
preexisting and shared set of values, the competing and contradictory forces at work in 
forging legal doctrine foreclose the establishment of the necessary consensus. Accordingly, 
legal doctrine is not a reflected embodiment of one indwelling and sufficient theory, but is 
the fonnal site for the attempted, but unattainable blending and reconciliation of competing 
theories. The temporary accommodations made are more a result of political expediency than 
moral purity. Although one theory may tend to dominate and infuse the law with its guiding 
principles, a competing theory will constantly challenge it and provide a debilitating set of 
counter principles. At times, the tension will precipitate doctrinal crisis, while at other times, 
the friction will be subdued and relatively untroubling. Yet, muted or manifest, it fuels and 
informs doctrinal development. The particular trajectory charted and followed will, at least 
in part, be a function of the larger historical forces that impinge on the legal and judicial 
enterprise.22 Consequently, in this general sense, law is another arena for the stylized struggle 
over the terms and conditions of social life. In sum, law is politics. 
As the critical position has gained intellectual ground, a number of misunderstandings 
have drifted (or been pushed) into popular circulation. The most persistent and pervasive of 
these hold that critics contend that law does not matter, that all cases can be decided either 
way, that judges act out of purely subjective preference, and that lawyers consciously 
manipulate doctrine. Although these misapprehensions are attributable to a whole range of 
prestigious sources, they are nicely brought together in a short article by Alvin Rubin.23 By 
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confronting them, the claim that "law is politics" can be clarified further and the charge that 
.. the law is indeterminate can be strengthened. 
Q A common opinion is that the critics are devoted to the view that "doctrjne is nothing. "24 
It is supposed that they maintain that legal doctrine is so fundamentally indeterminate that 
it possesses any meaning at all and has no magnetic pull on the resolution of particular 
disputes. Each case is imagined to be scribbled on a clean slate and can be decided in a variety 
of incompatible ways. This version of the non-autonomist position is a reductio ad absurdum. 
It exaggerates the consequences of a rigorous skepticism, ignores the historical point of the 
critical inquiry, and takes the political edge off the critique. It is definitely not the non-
autonomists' case that there can be no general consensus on the shape and substance of past 
doctrine nor that the resolution of particular cases cannot be confidently predicted. To ignore 
such facts is to counsel a dangerous other-worldliness. But it is the case that law fails to meet 
its own proclaimed standards of rational justification and cognitive clarity. Law is indeter-
' 
minate, but it is not arbitrary nor entirely unpredictable. Unsupplemented by external 
influences and values, legal doctrine can never, of itself, determine the "correct" and 
I "unique" answer to a particular dispute. Any fragi le consensus about meaning or any 
I confidence in prediction does not arise from within doctrine, but is given to doctrine from 
without. 
Legal doctrine is not simply "out there," but is always in need of collective retrieval and 
re-creation. The past is unknowable in and of itself. The past has passed and was what it was, 
but it is up to those who follow to decide what it will become: the future of the past is a present 
and continuing responsibility. Tangled in a skein of fact and fancy, history can never be 
excavated in its pristine immediacy, but can only be experienced secondhand. Consequently, 
meaning is always provisional, in that it is always open to (re )interpretation, and conditional, 
in that it is only knowable from an interpretive perspective. Legal reality is the historical 
J
, function of the ideological commitments that comprise a legal community at any given time, 
a community whose identity and expression is itself an interpretive artifact that is never "self-
present as a positive fact.''25 There does not exist a necessary and adequate connection 
between legal outcomes and doctrinal materials. 
None of this is intended to deny the shared sense of doctrinal intelligibility that everyone 
experiences at some time. Indeed, in the theoretical interrogation of"sharedmeaning," there 
is an implicit and unavoidable reliance on the practice of shared meaning.26 What it is in-
tended to do is to show that there can be no law without interpretation, no interpretation 
without judges, and no judges without politics. The crux of the matter is not the existence of 
institutional meaning and general predictability, but the source and authority of the normative 
reading offered or supposed. On what basis can one reading be privileged over another? Legal 
doctrine need not be as it is; it always contains the resources for its own reinterpretation and 
revision. Doctrinal cons~stency and regularity are not attributable to law, but to the politics 
of lawyers. While every case could be decided doctrinally in contradictory ways, the 
relatively homogeneous values oflawyers and judges ensure that some results will be much 
more likely than others. Law's reconstmctive potential can never be squeezed out by its 
present actuality; closure of doctrinal openness is only bought at the price of intellectual self-
delusion and philosophical puzzlement. Accordingly, the critical truth is that doctrine is not 
nothing, but a special kind of something. It means nothing until it is interpreted and, although 
it will always have meaning, its meaning will be determined by those who interpret it. 
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f?') A second misunderstanding, which flows from the first, is that, if there is any validity 
"lothe critics' claims, it only has any force in cases "which are unusual, indeed exceptional. "27 
This argument relies on the familiar distinction between easy and hard cases. Whereas the 
vast majority of cases will be straightforward and capable of disposition through the 
uncontroversial application of precedent, a small minority of cases will raise novel or 
contested issues and require a more creative approach that goes beyond precedent. There 
remains disagreement within the traditional ranks as to what extent judges in hard cases are 
constrained by doctrine in its larger sense.28 
The easy/hard case distinction is more of a deferral of the autonomy issue than a 
definitive resolution of it. The difficulty centres on the method by which such a distinction 
is to be made and that method's origin and normative status. In order to maintain intellectual 
credibility, the distinction must be defensible in terms of its necessary and internal legal 
pedigree and not as the creature of contingent and external political considerations. To do 
otherwise would be to recognize that law is driven by politics and, as such, to deny the 
autonomy of law from politics. And this is exactly what reliance on the easy/hard case 
distinction does. Moreover, this manoeuvre points up a more general infirmity in the attempt 
to defend a law-politics separation. If law is valued because it is separable from politics, it 
can only be because it is politically desirable to effect such a separation. The autonomy oflaw 
cannot be intrinsically valuable, but must be justified by reference to nonlegal values. In 
short, the upshot is that the law-politics distinction is thoroughly political in character and 
ambition.29 
When analysis is pushed beyond the simple invocation of the easy/hard case distinction, 
its political nature is plain. Within the doctrinal and juristic materials, a hard case is one in 
which the application of precedent leads to a conclusion that is unacceptable because, for l 
example, it is out of step with conventional views of justice. This means that the easy case 
is one in which the conclusion is acceptable. It follows, therefore, that easy cases are not 
decided by purely doctrinal prompting, but merely couched in doctrinal language: it is 
prevailing ideas of "acceptability" that decide the case. Consequently, while it is true that 
most cases are easy, it is not because existing rules dispose of them, but because their 
disposition by the rules is considered to be acceptable.JO In effect, all cases are hard in the 
sense that they demand, no matter how unreflective or taken for granted, an initial appeal to 
extra-doctrinal considerations of acceptability. Easy cases are one kind of hard case, and any 
~fence of adjudicatory autonomy premised on their independence is destined to fail. 
'J9 The third common misunderstanding is that critics hold that "decision-making is pure 
result-selection followed by rationalization."31 This view posits the suggestion that judges 
are consciously manipulative ideologues who combine in a Machiavellian manner with their 
colleagues to implement a clear and self-serving scheme of social (in)justice. To associate 
critics with such a crude view of human decision making and motivation is to ignore their 
sophisticated articulation of the operation oflegaJ ideology. The ascription of such judgmental 
self-consciousness to individual actors is a feature of the very political philosophy that the 
critics are most at pains to discredit and dislodge. The whole critical enterprise is devoted to 
abandoning the dichotomous view that law is either the reflection of a pure reason or the 
exercise of pure power. Instead, it contends that reason and power are inseparable: each 
informs and provides the context for the other. 
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To be plausible, any critical theory of adjudication must be able to account for the judges' 
felt boundedness. It cannot discard the actual experience that decision makers have of being 
compelled by doctrine to reach particular results. Nevertheless, this existential fact does not 
require a denial of ideology. Its most important function is to offer a framework for 
formulating a personal identity and self-understanding, including the idea that we are 
independent operatives in the social world. Legal consciousness operates so effectively 
precisely because it persuades the "rulers" as well as the "ruled" that the judicial function is 
a constrained and impersonal exercise of official authority. It is as flawed to propose that the 
lawyer is everything as much as it is to suggest that the law is everything. Although there are 
instances of overt manipulation, legal doctrine amounts to more than the residual traces of 
the judicial mind's unbounded free-play. The posited distinction between "that to be 
interpreted" (doctrine) and " that which interprets" cannot be sustained.32 Neither doctrine 
nor lawyer exclusively controls meaning. Each is implicated by and in the other. Both 
doctrine and lawyer are shaped by their political milieu; they interact and interpenetrate to 
generate legal discourse and its reality. Judgment and values are neither the objective 
essences of an intelligible world nor the subjective fantasies of a chaotic existence. They are 
the contingent effect of varied and overlapping economiesofintellectual, social, and political 
thought. 
IV 
The proof of any theoretical pudding is in the eating. This is as true for the critics' position 
as it is for that of the traditionalists. The major argument that must be defended is that law 
is different from politics in that the application oflegal reasoning to particular problems will 
make an appreciable difference to their resolution. If these cases had been left to the ebb and 
flow of ideological exchanges, the autonomists' argument must be that the outcome would 
be different. Of course, it is not necessary for it to be shown that the result will be different 
in every case, only that there would be a difference in a statistically significant number of 
cases. Also, the autonomists must be able to demonstrate that this difference is attributable 
to a reliance upon legal reasoning and not traceable to the political preference of the legal 
reasoner. In short, the law per se must make a difference. 
For the traditional claim to pull any epistemological weight, its proponents must show 
that law is a rational discipline and not merely a convenient battery of technical rationalizations. 
Doctrinal justification must be more than conventional apparel for naked political preference. 
Furthermore, the demonstration that any particular decision is wrong or errant will not be 
enough in itself to support their arguments. Those who believe in law's determinacy must 
presumably accept a difference between being a bad judge and not being a judge at all. Rather 
than concentrate on the identifying criteria of legitimate legal reasoning, it can be more 
instructive to put the usual questions in a slightly different way - what might not amount 
to a legal analysis of the facts and the doctrinal matters in a particular dispute? And what might 
not count as a judicial resolution of them? 
In order to substantiate these criticisms and to join substantive issue with traditional 
scholars, I will d iscuss the case of Miller v. J ackson.33 It deals with the vexed issue of"coming 
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to the nuisance" -that is, whether it is a defence to an otherwise successful action in nuisance 
that the offending state of affairs existed prior to or at the time of the plaintiff's acquisition 
of land. Although it is generally agreed that this is not a defence, there still thrives a vibrant 
debate about its precise scope and application and meaning,34 After summarizing the facts 
and decision, I will critique one particular traditional account of the rule-Posner's - and 
offer my own "critical" reading of the judgments. The aim is not to show that there is no rule, 
nor that there is no better or worse result in specific circumstances, but to establish that the 
doctrine does not of itself preclude or require any particular outcome and that no one result 
is uniquely preferable to any other. 
The Millers lived on a housing estate that was recently built by a cricket ground where 
cricket had been played for about 70 years. As a result of their complaints, the club erected 
a high fence to prevent balls invading their garden. This proved to be no real deterrent and 
according to the Millers, the situation became so intolerable that they felt obliged to vacate 
their home whenever a game was played. Finally, they applied to the court for an injunction 
to restrain the playing of cricket. The club conceded that, while cricket was played, there was 
no foolproof way of stopping cricket balls going into the Millers' garden. However, the club 
denied that its activities amount to an unreasonable interference with the Millers' enjoyment 
of their property. Moreover, it insisted that it had taken all reasonable measures to protect the 
Millers. 
Although the Millers were successful at first instance, the Court of Appeal upheld their 
claim for damages, but refused to grant an injunction against the playing of cricket. In 
reaching this decision, the reasoning of the judges is all over the doctrinal map. Lord Denning 
M.R. concluded that there was no negligence and no nuisance. As the club had offered to pay 
$800 for past and futu re damages, he ordered the payment to the Millers of that amount. At 
the other extreme, Geoffrey Lane L.J. held that there was both negligence and nuisance and 
that an injunction should be granted. As a consoling gesture to the club, he postponed its 
issuance for 12 months in order to allow for the location of a new ground. Finally, Cumming-
Bruce L.J. occupied a middle position and determined that there was both negligence and 
nuisance. However, he refused to grant an injunction and awarded damages of $800. 
Accordingly, while the Millers won their action and recovered $800 in damages, cricket was 
s till played and balls continued to pepper their garden. 
The fact that the judges' reasoning and conclusions are so evidently at odds with one 
another confirms little. But it does offer a rich set of textual materials with which to work. 
While some might want to criticize a particular judgment as unsound or impolitic, it is 
difficult to suggest that any of the three judgments does not amount to legal reasoning or 
cannot be justified in terms of the existing doctrinal materials. Legitimacy or validity is not 
the issue; rather, it is one of wisdom and cogency. Yet, when each judgment can claim to be 
a plausible performance of the judicial craft, it renders somewhat transparent the assertion 
that law is a constrained mode of decision making. Of course, it could be contended that, if 
one of the judges explicitly and exclusively decided the case on the basis that the playing of 
cricket should be promoted ahead of all other activity, he or she would not be acting judicially. 
Instead, they would be deciding in line with their own personal values and preferences. 
However, at best, this merely shows that a decision that is not couched in the language of the 
law does not deserve the label "legal." This is not a particularly devastating charge or 
interesting revelation. 35 For it to be so, it would have to be demonstrated that the decision was 
r 
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not motivated by "nonlegal" considerations and then framed in the conventional rhetoric of 
legal argumentation. It is surely the case that the demagogue does not become a democrat 
because she dresses like one. Rationalization is not reasoning. 
The critic would clearly be wrong to argue that it is not the generally stated rule that 
"coming to the nuisance is no defence to nuisance." But this does not dispense with the 
indeterminacy claim, it simply offers a site at which to locate and begin the deconstructive 
excavation. Indeed, Posner's discussion of the rule and his implicit acceptance of its 
uncontroversiality establish the ground for such an opportunity. While it is easy to state the 
existence of the rule, it is much more difficult to explain its meaning and scope. Posner's own 
illustrations of the problems with applying the rule in djfferent fact situations undermine 
rather than reinforce his autonomist commitments. He provides clear confirmation of the 
critics' major claims: that there is a large gap between general rule and particular result; that 
the gap can only be filled with extra-legal considerations; and that these considerations will 
be the dete1minative factor in any decision. All in all, his arguments give modem emphasis 
to the traditional sentiment that the law of nuisance "is immersed in undefined uncertainty. "36 
Posner approves of the "no defence" rule not because it is simply the law, but because 
it is defensible as a matter of sound economic policy. When interpreted as placing liability 
on the party who could have avoided competing resource uses at the least cost, it enhances 
the maximization of wealth by ensuring that patterns of resource use are not "frozen" and that 
the possibility of changing use is reflected in the investment decisions of land developers.37 
Nevertheless, Posner cautions that "rejecting coming to the nuisance is the efficient rule 
provided costs are calculated on the correct ex ante basis. "38 For example, where a long-
established polluting factory is gradually engulfed by encroaching suburban developments, 
the relevant balancing is not between the relative moving costs of the factory and the 
suburbanites, but is between the moving costs of the factory and the cost at which the 
suburbanites could have initially located elsewhere. 
Of course, the outcome of this balancing will depend upon the particular costs in each 
case. In the example Posner uses, because the factory's costs are less than those of the 
suburbanites, the result is that there is no nuisance and the factory can continue its operation 
(and polluting). This seems that, in those particular circumstances, coming to the nuisance 
is a very real and effective defence. This is a flat contradiction of Posner's support for the 
common law's rejection of the defence. Posner compounds this dissemblance in this 
discussion of the familiar Spur Industries case, in which the court held the defendant's 
activities to be a nuisance, but ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant's moving costs.39 
He supports this "ingenious" decision on the basis that it "creates an incentive for the party 
coming second . .. to go elsewhere instead if its costs of locating elsewhere, prior to its 
locating next to the nuisance, would be lower than the cost to the defendant of moving."40 
This is an express negation of the common law rule and a demonstration of its indeterminacy, 
not an account of its determinate explication and application. 
Nevertheless, although Posner manages to reject the general rule in the course of his 
professed support for it, it could be contended that the economic rule of"least-cost avoider" 
is sufficiently determinate to deflect such criticisms. This response fails for at least two 
reasons. First, the deeper and more ideological difficulty is that any calculation of allocative 
efficiency is always dependent upon contestable and, therefore, indeterminate assumptions 
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linked to whether or not a person already possesses it and what other resources they might 
already possess.41 Second, the "least·costavoider" rule is open to exactly the same objections 
as the "no defence" rule. The major stumbling block is the notorious difficulty of isolating 
and quantifying the relevant costs with the necessary degree of confidence and precision. Not 
only will much depend on the level of transaction costs, but the respective costs of the parties 
are so detailed and so interdependent that their calculation is always speculative and 
hypothetical- Who are the relevant parties? Is it the plaintiff, the suburbanites at large, or 
the developer? What amounts to a cost? Who or what decides cost in a particular case? When 
is valuation to occur? In short, general theoretical plausibility is confounded by specific 
factual malleability. As Judge Posner has remarked, "the exactness which economic analysis 
rigorously pursued ~ppears to offer is, at least in the litigation setting, somewhat delusive. "42 
All these observations on Posner's analysis can be brought together in considering his 
likely response to the Mill er case. By his lights, anything is possible and all bets are on. The 
looseness of his "least·cost avoider" interpretation guarantees that any outcome can be 
justified and supported- the continuance of cricket; the continuance of cricket with payment 
of damages; the prohibition of cricket; and the prohibition of cricket with compensation for 
relocation. The crunch question is what costs are to be included in the social calculus. It is 
surely the case that the economic variables can be selected and quantified to ensure very 
different computations of the economically optimal result. Indeed, more to the point, there 
is no technical or objective way in which to assign or formulate such costs. Some values will 
be overlooked, while others will receive disproportionate attention.43 Is it the costs of the 
Millers that are to be tabulated? Or is it the initial relocation costs of the developer of the 
residential estate that should be assessed? What about those neighbours who view the 
proximity of the cricket club as a benefit? Is the valuation to be based on general market 
prices? Or is it the Millers' idiosyncratic costing that should prevail? Do the club's costs 
include the inconvenience to the players, spectators, and their opponents? How is such 
disappointment to be quantified? Is tradition or local culture to count at all? 
Once the "appropriate" costing and calculation has been made, the decision would 
presumably be written up by Posner in his favoured style of judicial reasoning. Moreover, 
whatever outcome is arrived at, the decision will simply be a card to be played in the 
continuing game of bargaining and behaviour modification. The law will not be the arbiter 
of the dispute, but will only be a factor in the workings of the market. In theory, for instance, 
the club could "buy out" any injunction awarded to the Millers or the Millers could "bribe" 
the club to continue their cricket elsewhere. This raises another thorny problem of valuation, 
namely, wealth effects. Is the relevant figure the amount the Millers would be willing to pay 
to the club to stop the cricket or is it the amount the Millers would be willing to accept from 
the club to permit the cricket? In answering these riddles, the so·called traditional virtues of 
doctrinal predictability, determinacy, and integrity are ransomed to the cause of a spurious 
and crude political instrumentalism. The law becomes the agent of the market rather than its 
principal and legal theory becomes the tool of the marketeer. 
·------·-- --- -- -- - - - -- - ------.... -
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This critique of Posner can be generalized and tied to a broader theory of legal interpretation. 
I shall call this "deconstruction. "44 Although it has come to be used as a general catch-all for 
any unconventional criticism of law and legal theory, it is a very subversive and profound 
form of philosophical critique. Its target is the whole edifice of western metaphysics. In 
jurisprudential terms, the ambition is to show that law and legal doctrine are not and cannot 
be informed by an overarching rationality. It is not that legal doctrine is irrational, 
nonrational, or meaningless, nor that it is any more or less rational than any other mode of 
thought or reasoning. On the contrary, deconstruction shows that law is of a piece with other 
forms of social knowledge. There is no rationality, but there are many rationalities and all are 
as historically conditioned, politically specific, and socially constructed as each other. 
Deconstruction is not a philosophy, but a theoretical strategy for displacing traditional 
philosophy, especially its insistence upon the existence of a stable foundation for truth and 
knowledge. However, for the deconstructionist, referentiality and meaning are not so much 
nonexistent as profoundly problematic. The attempt to demonstrate and defend any theory 
of embodied meaning is ruthlessly revealed as leading into a black hole of historical 
deferment. No interpretation is right or wrong and no mode of linguistic signification can 
achieve interpretive hegemony. It is not that deconstruction erases meaning or denies 
intentionality, but that it perpetually postpones and decentres them and thus deprives them 
of any privileged or original authority. It foils any orderly attempt to progress to knowledge 
or recover meaning by denying that there can ever be philosophical closure to the vertiginous 
attempts at historical appropriation. Nonetheless, deconstruction is not randomly or wantonly 
destructive. It takes the object of its critique and, working to collapse it from within, 
deconstructs the constructs of philosophy to better reveal their constructedness. 
To understand and control the world, traditional thinking employs a set of enabling 
djstinctions that are treated as natural and obvious, such as objective/subjective, reason/ 
emotion, or mind/body. This means that any coherent and cogent account of fixed meaning 
and grounded knowledge must not only explain the precise and stable relation between these 
oppositions, but also find a way of talking about them that is itself precise and stable. It claims 
to do this by privileging one over the other and granting epistemological authority to it. In 
contrast, deconstruction goes behind these hierarchical dichotomies and shows that they have 
a history and are far from natural or obvious. Operating from inside the traditional paradigm, 
deconstruction unravels and lays bare the contradictory, inescapable, and warring forces that 
both constitute and confound the common sense meaning of words and texts. A good example 
of this is the historically constructed and contexted distinction of male/female, which is used 
to justify a whole set of conceptual and social practices. 
Moreover, these duplicitous dualities of consciousness cannot be sustained. The 
unprivileged "other" disrupts and undennines its privileged partner. While it is a necessary 
contra_st to it, it is also a contradiction of it. So interrelated are they that the one not only makes 
the other possible, but contributes to its negation: "neither/nor, that is, simultaneously either 
or."45 In short, what is excluded is implicated in and is essential to what is included: 
philosophy depends on the very history that it is at pains to deny. The metaphysical dream 
of providing a solid foundation for truth and know ledge is doomed to failure by its own lights. 
Importantly, however, the deconstructive technique is not intended simply to reverse the 
t 
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hierarchical order and place-for instance, community over individual or woman over man 
in terms of epistemological authority. It is to be understood as rejecting entirely the 
dichotomous and passive mode of thinking about the world, in favour of a more engaged and 
active way of truth-making. 
The three judgments in Miller offer a rich textual diet on which the hungry critic can 
feast.46 In particular, Denning's judgment is an opportunity par excellence for the 
deconstructionists to show their analytical stuff. It is a textbook example of the flipability of 
supposedly opposite categorizations and the arbitrary priorization of one term over the other. 
The deconstructive challenge is to describe the process by which this occurs and the interests 
that it serves. As such, critique is a simple laying bare of contradiction's insidious existence 
at the heart of doctrinal being. Denning's efforts to negotiate the public/private distinction 
set the stage perfectly for such a description: 
[l]t is our task to balance the right of the cricket club to continue playing cricket ... as against the 
right of the householder not to be interfered with .... There is a contest here between the interest 
of the public at large and the interest of a private individual. The public interest lies in protecting 
the environment by preserving our playing fields in the face of mounting development, and by 
enabling our youth to enjoy all the benefits of outdoor games, such as cricket and football. The 
private interest lies in securing the privacy of his home and garden without intrusion or 
interference by anyone .... As between their conflicting interest, I am of the opinion that the public 
interest should prevail over the private interest (981-82)47 
It takes little imagination to realize that Denning's pouring of social wine into the 
.::onceptual bottles of public and private interests can be of a very different kind. The playing 
of cricket can be as "private" a matter as sitting out in the sun and the security of people's 
homes can be as "public" a matter as the preservation of playing fields. Although the 
flipability of Denning's characterization is plain and simple in Miller, it is possible to make 
such a switch in all situations. In short, the raw materials of life do not present themselves to 
policymakers as always and already divided into natural categories of social interest. The 
world is not given, but is constantly being made and re-made. Seeds of fact reap a rich harvest 
of values only when cultivated by ideological gardeners. Denning's depiction of the 
contestants is a prescriptive act of creation rather than a descriptive report of detachment. 
Having established the competing interests and assigned the litigants to their respective 
sides of the balancing scales, Denning proceeds to place his thumb on the side of public 
interest. In such contests, he seems to assume that it is axiomatic that "the public interest 
should prevail over the private interest" (982). The whole judgment is given over to 
establishing a rhetorical climate in which the prevalence of the public interest seems obvious 
and natural. Yet Denning offers no argument as to why this conclusion should be treated as 
self-evident. Indeed, he begs the very question that this analysis is supposedly directed 
toward answering - when and why does the public interest prevail over private interest? 
When it comes to the decisional crunch, the Master of the Rolls hides behind declaratory 
platitudes, like "[o]n taking the balance, I would ... " and "[a]s between their conflicting 
interest, I am of the opinion ... " (981 and 982), and elides any explanatory reasoning. His 
judgment draws its appeal and cogency, if any, from his efforts to tap the political sensibilities 
and sympathies of its intended audience than from the logical rigour of its doctrinal analysis. 
...... -------------------- - - -···--· -------·---- -
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The style and phrasing of Denning' s offering is structured by the contradictory impulses 
of "progress" and "tradition." Although his judgment is voiced predominantly in the accent 
of a progressive preference for calculations of public interest in matters of competing land 
use, there is a more subtle idiom of traditional rhetoric that runs alongside and is often 
intertwined with the more dominant tone. At the same time that he refuses "to approach this 
case with the eyes of the judges of the 19th century" and insists that " it should be approached 
on principles applicable to modern conditions" (978 and 981 ), he is adamant that temporal 
priority is deserving oflegal precedence. He frequently and pejoratively contrasts the cricket 
club's long-standing contribution to the community to the Millers' status as "newcomers" 
(976 and 981). In this consummate exercise in judicial craft, Denning manages to couch a 
defence of vested property rights in the language of social progress. For all his rhetorical 
support for progress and public interest, the driving force of the decision is the conservative 
desire to preserve the status quo: "I would agree [with Lord Reid' s dictum that 'if cricket 
cannot be played on a ground without creating a substantial risk, then it should not be played 
there at all'] if the houses or road was there first and the cricket ground came there second" 
(977).48 Of course, to reach the same result, Denning could have run a more straightforward 
traditional defence of vested interests, but this would have robbed the decision of much of 
its success as a rhetorical exemplar. 
Cumming-Bruce and Geoffrey Lane take a different tack to Denning, but still manage 
to ground themselves on the shoals of contradiction. The particular dilemma that they 
perceive, and from which they seek to escape, is that between precedent and equity or, in 
grander terms, between positive law and natural law. It is a m anifestation of the tension 
between the desire for stability and certainty and the simultaneous urge for flexibility and 
maneuverability. At the heart of this dilemma is the acceptance that justice demands, as an 
institutional matter, both the general embrace of rule-driven adjudication and the occasional 
departure from it; "the rules transcend the case as immediately experienced, the insight is 
immanent in it."49 The challenge for judges is to decide in which particular circumstances 
the general rules are to be observed or overlooked. The traditional response by which to 
contain and mediate this contradiction has been the regular, but unconvincing resort to 
"discretion." 
For both Cumming-B111ce and Geoffrey Lane, their personal sympathies lay with the 
cricket club, whose officials they found to be "candid and forthright" (984), rather than with 
Mrs. Miller, whom they thought verged on the "neurotic" and "obsessive" (983 and 989). 
However, they both also agreed that existing doctrine seemed to mandate a result in the 
Millers' favour. This presented them with the classic contest between the pull of precedent 
and the lure of justice. For Geoffrey Lane's part, he opts to follow the rules laid down. But, 
in doing this, he does not act against justice, but in the name of justice. He collapses the 
distinction between law and equity by assuming that justice requires strict obedience to the 
results of rule application: 
Precedent apart, justice would seem to demand that the plaintiffs should be left to make the most 
of the site they have elected to occupy with all its obvious advantages and equally obvious 
disadvantages .... If the matter were res integra, I confess I should be inclined to find for the 
defendants .... Unfortunately, however, the question is not open .... It may be that [the rule in 
Sturges v. Bridgman] works injustice, it may be that one would decide the matter differently in the 
absence of authority. But we are bound by [that] decision ... and it is not for this court as I see it 
to alter a rule which has stood for so long. (986-87) 
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Whereas Geoffrey Lane arbitrarily conflates law and equity, Cumming-Bruce arbitrarily 
separates them. He seeks to demonstrate that discretion can be used to temper the rule without 
swallowing the rule. It is a matter of equity being ordered by the law and discretion being 
required by the rules. While justice requires that rules are followed, the rules sanction the 
resort to discretion. It is an implicit attempt to instruct Geoffrey Lane in the possibilities of 
legal doctrine and judicial craft. Agreeing with Geoffrey Lane on "his reasoning and 
conclusion upon the liability of the defendants" (987), Cumming-Bruce relies upon the 
distinction between liability and remedy to escape the dilemma of contradiction: 
There is authority that, in considering whether to exercise a judicial discretion to grant an 
injunction, the court is under a duty to consider the interests of the public .... So on the facts of 
this case a court of equity must seek to strike a fair balance between the right of the plaintiffs to 
have quiet enjoyment of their house ... and the opportunity of the inhabitants of the village .. . to 
enjoy ... a summer recreation .... It is relevant circumstance which a court of equity should take 
into account that the plaintiffs decided to buy a house which .. . was obviously on the boundary 
of a quite small cricket ground .... There are here special circumstances which should inhibit a 
court of equity from granting the injunction claimed. (988-89) 
This deconstructive reading of Miller hopefully shows that legal doctrine is another 
combat zone over the terms and arrangements of social life. With varying degrees of 
sophistication, the three judges engage in a rhetorical exercise that is intended to persuade 
people (and themselves) that law possesses an autonomy from the open-ended encounters of 
overt ideological confrontation. In contrast, the responsibility of the critic is to counteract 
these attempts to depoliticize and dehistoricize the judicial development of doctrine. By 
reinstalling politics and history into the legal enterprise, people might come to see that the 
determination of legal meaning involves an inevitable taking of sides. Law is neither separate 
nor separable from disputes about the kind of world there is and can be. Law is the historical 
residue of one kind of political struggle. 
VI 
Nietzsche's apocalyptic announcement that "God is dead" echoed a truth that had been long 
grasped by most lawyers. The belief that law represented God's design never held much 
sway. It was conceded that law was a human artifact. It could never amount to much more 
(and was often much less) than a flawed distillation of divine wisdom. However, despite this 
traditional acknowledgment and modern protestations to the contrary, the enclaves of law 
remain "caves, for ages yet, in which His shadow will be shown."50 Instead of dwelling on 
God's loss, jurists must rest content with "voicing the dictates of a vague divinity";51 these 
pseudo-theological musings usually come veiled in the trappings of philosophy and economics. 
While lawyerliness might no longer be next to godliness, dreams of hubris still fire the 
jurisprudential imagination. Abstract reflection is given priority over experiential engage-
ment. Detached reason remains the touchstone for valid knowledge about ourselves, our 
situation, and the legal order. In the struggle for social justice, philosophy and science are 
preferred to democracy. As law is cast as an exercise in reason, lawyers are fated to become 
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philosophers or social scientists if law is to perfect itself and operate as a guide for the 
anguished democrat. 
Yet, with a recognition that reason and power are connected, this self-image of the 
lawyer or legal theorist as a trader in eternal verities must be abandoned. As the high priests 
of traditional theorizing, Posner and his ilk must be defrocked. Indeed, the whole theoretical 
endeavour will have to undergo a radical reappraisal and reorientation. Philosophy (of law) 
must cease to be a task of refined description and defined prescription; it must become a 
political project of deconstruction and reconstruction. The whole agenda of questions to be 
answered-What is law? How is it different from politics?-is in need.of redrafting. Loaded 
questions engender loaded answers. Those particular questions assume that law is indeed 
different and the jurist's primary task is to explain how it is different. Archibald MacLeish 
had the measure of contemporary scho]arsh i p: "we have learned the answers, all the answers; 
it is the question that we do not know."52 The answers that Posner and the autonomists 
propose cannot be rejected out of hand. But they can be stripped of their false objectivity and 
treated as one more series of proposals to be debated and considered in the popular assembly 
of democratic politics. As such, an explanation of the law's indeterminacy does not hasten 
the demise of democracy, as many traditional writ~rs seem to predict. This is merely a scare 
tactic designed to underwrite and warrant their own tenuous power. The indeterminacy 
critique is fatal to the legitimacy of the adjudicative enterprise, but it is not damaging to 
democracy. While indeterminacy jeopardizes any mode of objective decision making, it does 
offer an understanding of how ordinary citizens· can and must be entrusted with increased 
responsibility and authority in the name of democratic empowerment. 
To traffic in philosophical disillusionment is not to indulge in a cheerless cynicism. It 
is neither nihilistic nor irresponsible. By encouraging people to understand themselves as the 
makers of decisions and not as the amanuenses of a received wisdom, they will begin to 
assume great responsibility for those decisions' consequences and the ensuing society will 
become truly theirs. In this way, people will grasp that democracy is not about servitude to 
philosophical tyrants, interpretive Popes or legal emperors,53 but is about personal partici-
pation and social solidarity. In a world of incorrigible indeterminacy, the sane response is not 
despair or defeat. It is the bold acceptance that decision making is no more mysterious and 
no less complex than the rest of life. People must think, decide and act in the same way in law 
as they aspire to do in the rest of their lives- through concrete and constitutive conversations 
in which the participants speak and listen in a shared commitment to mutual enlightenment 
and continuing respect for the conversation's own ethical dynamic.54 This recognition and 
aspiration will mean that democratic practice will have to be given priority over legalistic 
values. The devaluation of the Rule of Law, in a society in which it has come to signify rule 
by lawyers, is not an occasion to be lamented. 
Within such democratic communities, intelligible action is not an extended genuflection 
to the revealed truth of Reason or Economic Efficiency, but is a situated act of constructive 
cooperation among ourselves. In all matters, decision making will be more than "the 
deliverance of a Reason so immanent that its own name is the only explanatory word it can 
utter."55 There will be a general sensitivity to the fact that rationality is less a guide or limiting 
condition for individual action and more an achievement and elaboration of social engagement. 
Within such an enlightened conte~t, indeterminacy will not engender efforts to gloss over or 
theorize it away. It will be attended to in a spirit of collective humility. While there is no relief 
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or escape from taking responsibility for life's always difficult and often painful decisions, 
there is a sustaining satisfaction in people facing and resolving them for themselves. 
Although it will be no less heated and contested, public policy-making can become a 
treasured creation of people's own craft and not the glossy product of legal chicanery. The 
appropriation of political discourse by a legal elite offends and inhibits the aspiration to 
progressive or egalitarian governance. In short, social justice will be brought about in spite 
of, not because of, lawyers. 
In Miller, although all three judges mentioned it in passing, there was an overlooked 
democratic solution to the problem. An informed and electorally-accountable body had 
already considered the issue. Lord Denning mentioned the matter of planning approval, but 
only to dismiss it as misguided: 
I must say that I am surprised that the developers of that housing estate were allowed to build the 
houses so close to the cricket ground. No doubt they wanted to make the most of their site and put 
up as many houses as they could for their own profit. The planning authorities ought not to have 
allowed it. The houses ought to have been so sited as not to interfere with the cricket. But the houses 
have been built and we have to contend with the consequences .... [The cricket club) have spent 
money, labour and love in the making of [the cricket ground]; and they have the right to play on 
it as they have done for seventy years. Is this all to be rendered useless to them by the thoughtless 
and selfish act of an estate developer in building right up to the edge of it? (976 and 978) 
Without speaking to the procedural niceties or substantive merits, it can be assumed that 
the development was neither entirely "thoughtless" nor "selfish." Before the developers 
could proceed, they had to obtain planning permission. This would have had to be granted 
in accordance with established regulations, formulated policies and required procedures. By 
ignoring this fact, the court substituted its own decision for that of the planning authorities'. 
Moreover, it did so without troubling to apprise itself of the details or reasoning of the 
planning authorities. However, the point is not who made the "correct" or "right" decision; 
it is which is the most appropriate body, in terms of institutional competence and democratic 
legitimacy, to do the necessary balancing and compromising of competing interest. On both 
counts, a less-than-ideal municipal board is preferable to an ideal-as-possible judicial bench. 
In a democratic society, law will be another institutional site where the same contradictory 
impulses that constitute and challenge our individual selves can be openly addressed. And, 
as in our personal lives, any accommodation achieved in the response to indeterminacy will 
need to be self-conscious, tentative, and revisable. No signposts on life's journey will be 
found that are not of our own making. A realization might dawn that it is only possible to 
illuminate the way into the historical dark of the future by the clarity of our joint commitment 
and engagement. Rather than sight and pursue an imaginary light at the end of the historical 
tunnel-it will only be some philosopher's torch or economist's lantern anyway- we must 
look to each other. There is no shirking that responsibility. Domination and thraldom are all 
that can be hoped for when it is believed that theological relief is close at hand. The 
transcendental search will have to give way to the quest for greater participatory democracy. 
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QUESTIONS 
1. Is Critical Legal Studies just a fancy version of Marxism, or does it offer a different analysis 
of law? Jn particular, how does each approach deal with postmodemism? Can you identify 
the key elements of the postmodern perspective? Does postmodemism itself undercut the 
critical analysis? 
2. Is there anything about law, legal met~odologies, or ways of legal thinking that remains 
sacred in the eyes of the crit? Is the crit just a trasher? If everything is politics, are we not 
irretrievably forced back into a Hobbesian state of nature, where life is "solitary, poor, nasty, 
brutish, and short"? 
3. Does Hutchinson articulate a convincing alternative, democratic theory of law? 
4. Which is the more persuasive analysis of to1t law: Weinrib's self-proclaimed, apolitical, 
corrective justice approach, or Hutchinson's unabashedly political polemic? Which approach 
will better serve Canadian society? Is there such a thing as "Canadian society," or is that just 
a falsely constructed, pre-modern politico-juridicial edifice? 
5. Is anything beyond the realm of "politics"? Reconsider this question in the light of the 
feminist essays in this book. 
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